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FORD v. FORD: FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO CHILD
CUSTODY DECREES?*
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."' The application of
this constitutional mandate becomes relevant when a party to a judicial pro-
ceeding seeks to rely upon a foreign 2 judgment or statute. The absolute lan-
guage of the full faith and credit clause masks a difficult interpretive task
involving accommodation among conflicting principles: interests in national
unity, interstate comity, and finality of litigation support a broad application
of the clause, while interests of states in devising and enforcing their own
social policies militate against such a literal application.3
When a court is presented with a foreign decree awarding custody of a
child, the difficult problem of striking an appropriate balance between these
interests is complicated by uncertainty as to finality and modifiability of such
decrees in the granting state,4 by the introduction of technical issues of juris-
diction and. conflict of laws,5 and by an overriding concern for the welfare of
*Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
1. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1. For a general background on the origin and history of the
clause, see Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L.
REV. 1 (1944) ; Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 371 (1933) ;
Costigan, The History of the Adoption of § 1 of Art. IV of the United States Constitution.
4 CoLu. L. Rnv. 470 (1904).
2. The term "foreign" will be used throughout this Note to describe judgments or laws
of states other than the state of the present forum.
3. These conflicting principles have been sifted by the Court in several areas of the law
where full faith and credit is a problem. See discussion of the Court's interpretation of the
clause in workmen's compensation, divorce, and alimony cases, accompanying notes 60-68
infra. For conflicting views on how the issue should be resolved with respect to child custody
decrees, see text at notes 48-57 infra.
4. Courts universally regard custody decrees as modifiable when a "change of circum-
stances" has occurred. E.g., Note, The Changed Circumstances Rule in Child Custody
Modification Proceedings, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 543 (1952). See discussion of the use of the
"changed circumstances" doctrine, notes 54-55 infra, and accompanying text. Cf. RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 148 (1st ed. 1934).
5. Traditional conflict of laws doctrine bases custody jurisdiction on the domicile of
the child-a technical concept generally restricting jurisdiction to the state where the father
of the child is "domiciled.' See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 9, 30, 117, 144, 145 (1st
ed. 1934). Such decrees shall be enforced by other states. Id. § 147.
The modern trend, emphasizing the child's own stake in the custody decree, is toward
basing jurisdiction on the residence of the child. See Stumberg, The Status of Children in
the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 42, 55 (1940), and cases cited; Stansbury, Custody
and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAw & CONTFMP. PROB. 819, 823 (1944), and
cases cited; see also EHINZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 277 (1959). An early and important
statement of this principle was by Judge Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148
N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
The technical structure of the Restatement, ironically, is undermined by its allowance
that "any state into which the child comes" may refuse recognition to a foreign custody de-
cree "upon proof that the custodian.., is unfit to have control of the child," though subse-
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the child.6 Obviously reluctant to involve itself in these difficulties, the Su-
preme Court has avoided deciding the fundamental question of the applica-
bility of the full faith and credit clause to custody decrees. In New York ex
rel. Halvey v. Halvey,7 the Court, reserving decision on this question, held
that even if the full faith and credit clause applied in custody situations, it
would not require a second state to honor the terms of the original custody
decree where, under the circumstances-in this case the availability of new
evidence-reopening of the decree would have been permitted in the original
state.8 Later, in May v. Anderson,9 the Court held that credit need not have
been given to a foreign decree awarding custody of children to the father
where the mother had not been within the jurisdiction of the rendering court;
it is not clear, however, whether the decision rests solely upon an interpreta-
tion of the appropriate scope of the full faith and credit clause, or upon due
process grounds as well.10 The case thus does not clarify the impact of the
full faith and credit clause on child custody decrees. In Kovacs v. Brewer,"'
the Court reviewed, on certiorari, an explicit refusal by North Carolina to
give credit to a New York custody decree which the North Carolina court
said was contrary to the best interests of the child. The North Carolina court
had not indicated the extent to which its conclusion was based on evidence of
changed circumstances, which would have justified reopening of the decree
quent states into which the child may come need not recognize this change of custody unless
the state which made the change was also the state of the child's domicile, RESTATEMENT,
CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 148 (1st ed. 1934).
6. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views represent a translation of this concern into a federal
policy overriding the full faith and credit clause. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 609
(1958) (dissenting opinion); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953) (concurring
opinion). And see note 52 infra, and accompanying text.
7. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
8. So far as the Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, what Florida could do in
modifying the decree, New York may do.... [A] judgment has no constitutional
claim to a more conclusive or final effect in the State of the forum than in the State
where rendered.
330 U.S. at 614.
9. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
10. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whose concurring vote was necessary for reversal, de-
clared that the decision was based solely on an application of the full faith and credit clause
to the particular facts of the case. Id. at 535-36 (concurring opinion). But Mr. Justice Bur-
ton's ambiguous opinion for the Court appears to rest, though not explicitly, on due process
deficiencies of the original decree (deprivation of the rights of the absent mother in her
children), operative in this instance through'the full faith and credit clause. Id. at 533-34.
Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), on the requirement of personal jurisdiction
in judgments affecting personal rights.
The confusion in May was aggravated by the unusual emphasis on parental rights by
the majority. For an excellent and sharp critique of both the Burton and Frankfurter
opinions, and a discussion of their prospective impact, see Hazard, May v. Anderson: Pre-
amble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REv. 379 (1959). For a somewhat milder, though
far from completely favorable, view, see Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws,
13 STAN. L. REv. 719, 766-70 (1961).
11. 356U.S. 604 (1958).
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under New York law. In the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Black stated that "the
case obviously raises difficult and important questions of constitutional law,
questions which we should postpone deciding as long as a reasonable alternative
exists. 112 The case was remanded for clarification and a possible determination
whether circumstances had changed, so that the Halvey rule would permit North
Carolina's modification.'3
In the recent case of Ford v. Ford,14 the Court went to unusual lengths to
avoid deciding the constitutional issue. Mrs. Ford brought an action in South
Carolina against her estranged husband for custody of their three children.
The year before, a Virginia court had dismissed his action against her for
custody of the children on the basis of an agreement between them, which was
represented to, but not examined by, the court. The Virginia "dismissed
agreed" judgment granted custody to the husband during the school year and
to the wife during vacation periods. In the wife's subsequent South Carolina
suit, the court awarded full custody to her despite both the absence of allega-
tion of a change in circumstances to justify modifiication and vigorous in-
sistence by the husband on the applicability of the full faith and credit clause
to'the Virginia decree. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas
modified the trial court's award, but similarly refused to give res judicata
effect to the Virginia decree. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
both courts, however, on the ground that under Virginia law, the "dismissed
agreed" order would be res judicata, and, in the absence of allegation or proof
of a change of circumstances, entitled to full faith and credit in South Caro-
lina.'
The Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court in a unani-
mous opinion 'written by Mr. Justice Black, who avoided the constitutional
question by taking issue with the South Carolina court's interpretation of Vir-
ginia'law.' 6 Investigating the Virginia precedents independently, the Court
found that Virginia would not consider a "dismissed agreed" order to be res
judicata in a child custody case. Thus South Carolina would not be required
to give credit to the Virginia decree in Ford even if the full faith and credit
clause were generally applicable to custody decrees.
12. Id. at 607.
13. Id. at 608. The decision provoked an unusually passionate dissent from Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who complained that the Court, despite its express disclaimer, had impliedly
decided that full faith and credit must be granted in the absence of a showing of changed
circumstances. Justice Frankfurter made a vigorous plea for liberating states from the full
faith and credit clause to enable them to act forthrightly in the interests of the child. Id. at
609.
14. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
15. Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 123 S.E.2d 33 (1961). Mr. Justice Oxner dissented, id. at
318, 123 S.E.2d at 39, on the ground that there had been no litigation of the question of the
welfare of the child in Virginia, and thus no exercise of the judicial function by the Virginia
court so as to entitle its decree to full faith and credit. While Mr. Justice Black's opinion for
the Supreme Court was also tinged with strong policy overstones of a similar nature, his
reasoning proceeded on a less drastic course. See text at notes 16-20 infra.
16. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 190-94 (1962).
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Although the Court acted within its power in reinterpreting the law of one
state to relieve another state of a putative obligation to honor the first state's
decree, and to relieve itself of the necessity to decide a difficult question of
federal law, 17 the reinterpretation which enabled it to do so may be questioned.
Virginia cases, construing the effect of "dismissed agreed" orders in a variety
of situations, hold uniformly that such judgments are res judicata.18 These
cases were distinguished by the Court in Ford on the ground that they "in-
volved purely private controversies which private litigants can settle, and none
involved the custody of children where the public interest is strong."'1 The
Court then cited Virginia cases to the effect that in child custody awards the
17. The Court's method of adjudication in disposing of the full faith and credit question
itself rests on a firm constitutional foundation. First, a federal question was presented by
the allegation that full faith and credit was unnecessarily granted, thus giving the Court
jurisdiction to decide the case. The statutory provision for certiorari jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (3) (1958), does not require that the federal right claimed shall have been denied by
the state court. ROBERTSON & KIRKHAMI, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 15, 16, 59 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951) ; STFR & GRESSMAN, SU-
PREME COURT PRACTICE §§ 3-5, at 70 (3d ed. 1962). The Court in interpreting the full faith
and credit clause acts as an arbiter of the federal system; and arguably the function of that
system is disturbed as seriously by an overapplication as by an underapplication of -the
clause.
In this connection, an interesting interpretive argument has been advanced: the Congres-
sional statute enacted pursuant to the full faith and credit clause provides that judgments,
records and acts of any state "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court.., as
they have ... in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1958) (emphasis added). The words "the same," it is suggested, indicate that too much
as well as too little full faith and credit can present a federal question, under the statute if
not under the constitutional provision. See Abbott, Res Judicata as a Federal Question, 25
HARV. L. Ray. 443, 444-45 (1912).
In practice, the Court has sometimes decided cases where the question was an overap-
plication of full faith and credit. E.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) ; Industrial
Comm'n v.McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). An early holding, in Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S.
183 (1901), that an unnecessary granting of full faith and credit does not present a federal
question, has been consistently ignored. It is doubtful that giving credit to a foreign judg-
ment on general comity grounds would present a question for Supreme Court review. But
it is clear that where a court grants credit-as the South Carolina court did in Ford-only
because it feels constrained to do so by the Constitution a federal question is presented.
There is equally clear authority for the Court reinterpreting South Carolina's reading of
Virginia law. The Court will generally defer to a state court's interpretation of that state's
own law. See, e.g., Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 US. 495,
499-500 (1947); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 630 (1946); Huddleston v.
Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944) ; cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). But it
has been repeatedly held that no such deference is necessary to a state court's interpretation
of foreign law. This principle was forcefully espoused by Mr., Justice Stone in Barber v.
Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 81 (1944). And see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 217-18 (1942) ;
Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 287-88 (1939) ; Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 64 (1938).
18. Murden v. Wilbert, 189 Va. 358, 361, 53 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1949) ; Hinton v. Norfolk
& Western Ry., 137 Va. 605, 609, 120 S.E. 135, 136 (1923) ; Bardach Iron & Steel Co. v.
Tenenbaum, 136 Va. 163, 171, 118 S.E. 502, 504-05 (1923) ; Hoover v. Mitchell, 66 Va. 387
(1874).
19, Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187,192 (1962).
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best interests of the child, as contrasted to the wishes of the parents, must be
the primary consideration. In view of this overriding policy, the Court rea-
soned, Virginia courts would not regard as final this "dismissed agreed" judg-
ment, in which the trial court investigated neither the interests of the children
nor the terms of the agreement.20
Since Virginia courts had never given any indication that they would place
a public interest limit on the res judicata effect of "dismissed agreed" decrees,
the Court's reading of Virginia law can fairly be identified as the more imag-
inative one. The distinction upon which the Court based this reading-between
private controversies and those affected with a public interest-is certainly
arguable in terms of Virginia's expressed aim of providing for the welfare of
children in custody decrees. Rather than merely expostulating state law and
policy, however, the Court seemed to be expounding an independent federal
policy respecting procedural standards for child custody awards, 21 arising from
its own substantive view that consent decrees are an inadequate means of
resolving child custody questions. 22 Although the Court in Ford refrained from
forthrightly taking the position that full faith and credit need not be granted
to custody decrees which fail to meet certain procedural or substantive stand-
ards, such a rationale seems implicit in the Court's decision.
Procedural considerations in child custody dispositions are perhaps more
than usually intertwined with substantive standards. The generally proclaimed
standard for disposition, the "best interests of the child," 23 suggests that:
the minimum nexus between the court and child that must exist before
the court's award of the child's custody should carry any authority is that
the court should have been in a position adequately to inform itself re-
garding the needs and desires of the child, of what is in the child's best
interests. And the very least that should be expected in order that the
investigation be responsibly thorough and enlightening is that the child
be physically within the jurisdiction of the court and so available as a
source for arriving at Solomon's judgment.2
20. Id. at 192-93.
21. For previous views by members of the Court pointing to the development of such a
policy on child custody, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinions, supra note 6, and for a
sharply different attitude, May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting).
22. The Court stated:
Unfortunately, experience has shown that the question of custody, so vital to a child's
happiness and well-being frequently cannot be left to the discretion of parents. This is
particularly true where, as here, the estrangement of husband and wife beclouds
parental judgment with emotion and prejudice.
Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962).
23. The "best interest!' standard came into prominence as early as 1881, in a famous
Kansas decision written by Judge (later Mr. justice) Brewer. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Ian.
650 (1881). It gradually became the dominant standard in the custody field. See, e.g., Sayre,
Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. Car. L. REv. 672, 676-77 (1942) ; Brown, The Custody
of Children, 2 IND. L.J. 325 (1926). For a compendium of cases subscribing to "best in-
terests" as the controlling factor in custody awards, see 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 309(2) (1959).
24. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 613-14 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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If child custody procedures were uniformly of high caliber, a thorough in-
vestigation of the best interest of the child through utilization of psychological
and social work personnel and data might be ensured in virtually every case. 5
Under those circumstances, an argument in favor of using the full faith and credit
clause to protect the child from relitigation of the custody award might well
be persuasive. 20 Assuming the original award to have been made in his best
interests, to enforce full faith and credit would appear to enhance the child's
welfare by stabilizing the child-custodian relationship.27 But the inadequacy
of state procedures is notorious. 23 This being the case, application of a flexible
rule, enabling inquiry by the courts of any state in which jurisdiction may be
obtained, may at least have the advantage of encouraging more thorough con-
sideration of the child's interests. Overall, it might appear that the Supreme
Court could contribute substantially to fulfilling the promise of the "best in-
terests of the child" test by hinging the applicability of the full faith and credit
clause to custody dispositions on the extent to which state procedural require-
ments encourage realistic inquiries into the child's welfare.
But investigation into the procedural sufficiency of custody dispositions is
difficult to justify as a proper or feasible course for the Court. Custody pro-
cedures vary greatly among the states and are the subject of much contro-
versy.29 The differences in practice and belief often rest upon irreconcilable
25. See Comment, Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases, 24 U. CHI. L.
REv. 349 (1957) ; Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 49
(1953). There has been a remarkable absence of commentary on the use of psychological
data in custody cases. For a recent decision based largely on psychiatric testimony, see
Root v. Allen, 377 P2d 117 (Colo. 1962), noted infra at 151. But see Plant, The Psychiatrist
Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 807, 817 (1944), for a sug-
gestion (from a psychiatrist) that the judge is best qualified to make a "common sense"
decision as to the child's best interests.
26. This argument is made, of course, even in the context of the generally low quality of
custody procedures now prevalent. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541-42 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ; Note, Effect of Custody Decree in a State Other Than Where
Rendered, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 970 (1933).
27. Even were custody procedures uniformly good, this argument is not without its
problems. States may still have different policy goals regarding the upbringing of children;
the state where the child resides might want to affect that child's life in a different way or
for a different purpose than the state which first awarded custody. Furthermore, if pro-
cedures were uniformly good, and the best interests of the child everywhere investigated,
it could be assumed that courts permitted to re-examine foreign custody decrees would con-
sider, as a constituent of the welfare which they were seeking to ensure, the interest of the
child in stability and security of environment, i.e., in the continuation of the original award.
28. Only nineteen states, for instance, authorize or require a social worker's investiga-
tion. Comment, Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases, supra note 25 at 357-58
n. 49. The child's interests are not given party representation, and the presence of the child
is seldom required. KEEZER, MARIu.AGE AND DIVORCE § 715 (3d ed., 1946). Such resources as
there are are often drastically overworked. GEt.LHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE
CouRTs or NEW Yoiu Crr ch. 12 (1954).
29. Statutes in the field generally leave a wide discretion to courts. See VERNIR,
AimERcAx Fm..my LAWS § 95 (1932). In practice, procedures differ greatly, and there is
widespread controversy. See, e.g., Comment, Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody
Cases, supra note 25. Compare Chute, supra note 25, and Lemkln, Orphans of Living
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views of the nature of the substantive interests to be accounted for-parental
rights,30 the child's own rights, and the appropriate role of the state as parens
patriae. These fundamental policy disagreements may be reflected in differences
in the treatment of: the possibility of award to someone other than a parent ;31
the function of professional personnel in deciding the custody issue, and the
kinds of data which might be used ;32 the extent of participation by the child
in the custody proceedings and the way his interests are to be represented ;33
and the suitability of adversary proceedings for the resolution of conflicts over
custody.34 It is difficult to believe that there is a "right answer" concerning
most of the controversies regarding child custody procedures. For example,
the differences concerning the use of psychological data in the determination
of custody reflect basic conflicts as to the role of "experts" in evaluating sub-
jective human experience.3 5
The resolution of these policy conflicts seems preeminently suited for the
kind of state experimentation essential to the functioning of the federal sys-
tem ;3 the Court would be misconceiving its role as arbiter of the federal
Parents: A Comparative Legal and Sociological View, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 834,
846-47, with Plant, supra note 25.
30. Some states expressly give effect to parental rights in the form of presumptions-
in favor of the mother when the child is of a "tender age," or in favor of the natural parent
as against a third party. See Comment, Custody of Children: Best Interests of Child vs.
Rights of Parents, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 306 (1945); Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards
Custody, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 721, 729 (1944) ("Human experience has demonstrated
that children ordinarily will be best cared for by those who are bound to them by ties of na-
ture."). While the universally proclaimed standard of courts in awarding custody is the
"best interests of the child," the adversary system inevitably distorts this goal, and empha-
sizes the "rights" and interests of the parents. See, e.g., Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment
in New York: Juvenile Cases in the New Family Court, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 518 (1963).
31. Alternatives may include awards to other parties, or placement in a foster home or
social agency.
32. See note 25 supra.
33. The presence of the child, whose "best interests" are being adjudicated, before the
court, is generally not required. KEEZER, op. cit. supra note 28. The argument can be made,
moreover, that participation by the child would in fact be deterimental to his interests.
For a suggestion that the child's interest be represented in court, and a comparison of
European procedures, see Lemkin, supra note 29. For a discussion of the role of Michigan's
"Friend of the Court" in custody cases, see Pokorny, Observations by a "Friend of the
Court," 10 LAW & CONTEM1P. PROB. 778 (1944).
34. The development of a family court system providing services besides adjudication
has been suggested. See, e.g., Chute, supra note 25. For a colorful attack on the adversary
system in divorce cases, see Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses Out of the
Trenches, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 98 (1953). On the other hand, Ehrenzweig's "clean
hands" doctrine, discussed infra at note 55, seems to rest, implicitly, on an affirmation of
the adversary system.
35. See note 25 supra, especially Plant's interesting expression of confidence in the
trial judge.
36. For the classic statement of the idea that states must be allowed to experiment in
areas of social policy, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). And see Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
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system if it attempted to resolve these controversies by using the full faith
and credit clause to promote those procedures of which it approves.37 The
Court might, as it does with respect to state criminal procedures under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, lay down certain minimal
procedural safeguards. But the Court's role in supervising custody procedures
cannot be fully analogized to its role in supervising state criminal procedure.
In criminal matters the Court can draw on the accumulated experience of
centuries of Anglo-American criminal law in addition to its own experience
in the administration of federal criminal procedure. 38 In the relatively new
and developing field of family law, on the other hand, there is neither present
consensus, useful tradition, 39 nor independent Supreme Court experience or
expertise from which to draw standards. Since the "best interests" standard-
and, therefore, inquiry into the welfare of the child-is not a constitutionally
compelled one, procedures appropriate to that standard could only be im-
pressed upon the states if the standard were adopted as a federal common-law
policy binding upon -them; such policy adoption in itself restricts state experi-
mentation, and seems inconsistent with the Court's usual view of its role in
the federal system.40
Even were the area a legitimate one for federal concern, an attempt by the
Court to lay down standards might tend to be self-defeating. Because of the
wide variance in state practice,4 1 and the difficulty of choosing among the
manifold procedural complexities, the Court might be led to establish a low
minimum standard to which state procedures must comply. The Court's legiti-
mation of such a low norm could frustrate efforts within the states toward
reform and improvement of child custody procedures. 42
While it might seem that in such an extreme case as Ford the Court could
properly condemn the procedure in the first state as insufficient, such a de-
cision would be no less an imposition of the Court's own substantive policy
choices than, say, an insistence that psychiatric testimony be the basis of cus-
tody awards. It is not inconceivable that a state might adopt a policy of
encouraging consent decrees as a means of settling custody disputes. It might
37. Compare Erie MR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), where the Court denied itself
a role in shaping common law in diversity cases.
38. An early decision emphasizing the historical background of due process was Mur-
ray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856). For
an expostulation of the Court's role in supervising federal criminal procedure, see McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). See generally Schaefer, Federalism and State
Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. Rxv. 1 (1956) ; Boskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions
on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. CHr. L. REv. 266 (1946).
39. The common law "tradition" in child custody is bound up with such hoary concepts
as exclusive custody rights in the father. See, e.g., Sayre, Awarding CGtstody of Children,
9 U. CHi. L. REv. 672, 676 (1942) ; Brown, The Custody of Children, 2 IND. L.J. 325 (1926).
40. See notes 36-37 supra.
41. See note 29 supra.
42. For a discussion of the role of the Supreme Court in "legitimating" laws and prac-
tices, see BLAcK, THE PEOPLE AND THE CoURT 56-86 (1960) ; BiICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER-
ous BRANcH 29-33 (1962).
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do so to promote responsible attitudes on the part of separating parents, or
to reflect a feeling that a child's welfare is best served by leaving determina-
tion of his custody to his parents, or to save the child the trauma of a court-
room battle, or to conserve limited judicial resources for use in situations
where resolution by the parties themselves proves impossible. There is no
apparent constitutional reason why such choices could not be made, or why
they could not be expressed through inconsistencies between state procedural
and substantive standards, as seemed to appear in the Ford case.43 If the Court
finds sufficient strength in a federal policy of child interest protection to pre-
clude such a choice or mode of choice by a state, it must still face the prob-
lem of appearing to legitimate other procedures-only slightly less objection-
able from some perspectives-about which it cannot be as certain. To avoid
the problems outlined, the Court should refrain from following out the analysis
implicit in its opinion in Ford v. Ford.
Aside from its troubling suggestion regarding Court supervision of state
procedural standards, Ford gives conflicting hints as to how the Court will
decide the still open question of the effect foreign custody decrees must be
given under the full faith and credit clause. The Court obviously wanted to
reverse the South Carolina court's holding that the Virginia decree must be
given credit.44 Yet it could not avoid the decision by remanding, as it had in
Kovacs v. Brewer ;45 the South Carolina courts had specifically found that
there had been no change of circumstances.4 6 By its use of a strikingly orig-
inal interpretation of state law to avoid the constitutional issue, the Court may
have been intimating a feeling that, in general, full faith and credit would
have to be enforced in custody cases, if the issue were faced. On the other
hand, the Court's discussion of Virginia law, with its approving emphasis on
the idea that the best interests of the child should be the paramount and con-
trolling factor in custody awards, suggests that the Court may be moving
toward the position espoused by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,47 that in child cus-
tody, the policy behind full faith and credit is outweighed by the interest of
each state in providing for the welfare of children within its borders, so that
credit need never be granted.
There has been considerable debate, and strong arguments have been ad-
vanced, on both sides of the custody-full faith and credit question. The pro-
ponents of full faith and credit point to the literal mandate of the constitutional
provision and the enacting statute,48 and suggest that the only proper judicial
43. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1962). That the procedures by which a best
interests test is administered are adapted to substantive standards more consonant with
parental right doctrines is, in itself, an expression of state policy.
44. See text at notes 7-13 supra.
45. 356 U.S. 604, 608 (1958). See text at notes 11-13 supra.
46. Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 318, 123 S.E.2d 33, 39 (1961).
47. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 609 (1958) (dissenting opinion) ; May v. Ander-
son, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953) (concurring opinion). But see New York ex rel. Halvey v.
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 616 (1947) (concurring opinion).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
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role is an unyielding enforcement of that mandate.49 On a policy level, the
argument is made that certainty and finality are very important to all parties
concerned in child custody cases, especially the child; a stable, relatively stress-
free and affectionate relationship with an adult custodian is said to be of ut-
most importance to the child's successful personality development.50 It is al-
leged, further, that a failure to require full faith and credit will encourage
"kidnapping" of children by parents unsuccessful in custody battles, who hope
to obtain a modification of the decree in another state.51 The image of the child
as a ping-pong ball in a custody tournament between his parents is a favorite.
In reply, it is argued that if the welfare of the child is the primary concern,
foreign custody decrees should always be modifiable when the child's welfare
so requires. 52 It is pointed out that courts may always modify decrees if a
change in circumstances has occurred ;53 while most states pay lip service to
full faith and credit in custody cases, they very rarely give credit to a decree
of which they disapprove 5 4 (the South Carolina Supreme Court decision in
Ford v. Ford is an exception). A "change in circumstances" will readily be
found by a court interested in modifying a decree.55 Thus, requiring full faith
and credit would not, in the first place, necessarily reduce the frequency of
"kidnappings"; since full faith and credit is not a realistic bar, losing parties
desperate enough to advance upon such a course would still do so. Secondly,
it is pointed out, courts, even when they are not bound by full faith and credit,
tend to look with disfavor upon "kidnappers" seeking custody decree modifi-
49. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ;
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 24-30 (1945) ; Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 CoRxNu L.Q.
1, 6-7 (1921) ; Note, Effect of a Custody Decree in a State Other Than Where Rendered, 81
U. PA. L. REv. 970 (1933).
50. See generally Erikson, Growth and Crisis of the "Healthy Personality," in KLUcK-
HOHN, MURRAY & SCHNEDER, PERsozNALrry N NATURE, SOcIETY AND CULTURE 185-225
(1955), stressing the importance of the firm establishment and maintenance of an "affec-
tion-relationship" between the child and a parent-figure.
51. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541-42 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
52. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinions, note 47 supra; Stansbury, Custody and
Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAw & CONTEa-P. PROB. 819, 828-32 (1944);
Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MIcrH. L. REv. 345, 357 (1953) ;
1 EHENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 277 (1959) ; Note, Recognition of Sister State Child
Custody Decrees: Application of the Clean Hands Doctrine, 47 CAuIF. L. REv. 750 (1959).
53. See Note, The Changed Circumstances Rule in Child Custody Modification Pro-
ceedings, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 543 (1952).
54. Stansbury, supra note 52, at 829; Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Cuestody
Decrees, 51 MicH. L. REv. 345, 348 (1953).
55. This was recognized half a century ago by the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors:
As a finding of changed conditions is one easily made when a court is so inclined,
and plausible grounds therefor can quite generally be found, it follows that the recogni-
tion e-x-traterritorially which custody orders will receive or can command is liable to
be more theoretical than of great practical consequence.
Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 492-93, 77 Atl. 1, 6 (1910). See also STUMERG, CONFLICT
oF LAws 328 (2d ed. 1951).
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cations. 56 And in any event, the opponents of the clause argue, there is no
reason to expect that courts freed from the full faith and credit mandate, but
seeking to award custody in the best interests of the child, would not continue
to give considerable weight, in the interests of continuity and stability in the
child's development, to foreign custody decrees which have considered the
welfare of the child. Giving the states a free hand, it is urged, would not result
in a decline in the respect actually afforded foreign custody decrees; it would,
rather, enable courts to make forthright decisions, in the best interests of the
child, without having to resort to the presently misused and distorted doctrine
of change in circumstances.
57
Most of the debate on the issue seems to take the view that the problem is
soluble only by the adoption of one or the other alternative. Such a stark
choice may not provide the framework out of which a happy solution can
come. There is no reason why a balance cannot be struck between the two
extreme positions, taking into account the often strong interest of a state in a
particular problem or policy. 5 The Court, in interpreting the full faith and
credit clause in other areas of the law, has indicated the criteria which will
cause the balance-whether or not full faith and credit must be granted-to
swing one way or the other in a particular case.59 These uses of balancing
technique may prove adaptable to the child custody problem.
56. Professor Ehrenzweig has emphasized this fact in calling for judicial recognition of
a "clean hands" doctrine as a basis for refusing to disturb foreign custody decrees. See
Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MIcH. L. Rav. 345, 358-60
(1953) ; and 1 EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 286-90 (1959).
57. Stansbury, supra note 52, at 831.
58. The idea that the full faith and credit clause is not always an absolute mandate was
first fully articulated in an oft-cited opinion by Mr. Justice Stone in Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (dissenting opinion). In dissenting from a majority
holding that the clause required South Carolina to give credit to a child-support provision of
a Georgia divorce decree, Stone advanced the proposition that
there are many judgments.., though valid in the state where rendered, to which the
full faith and credit clause gives no force elsewhere .... There comes a point beyond
which the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own borders involves a forbid-
den infringement of some legitimate interest of the other.
Id. at 214-15. Justice Stone subsequently became the leading spokesman for the Court on
full faith and credit, and the balancing test became a standard ingredient of, and framework
for, analyses of problems arising under the clause.
Stone wrote for the Court in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935) ; Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) ; Pacific Em-
ployers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) ; Pink v. A.A.A. Highway
Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
See Cheatham, Stone on Conflict of Laws, 46 COLUm. L. REv. 719 (1946).
59. In addition to cases cited in note 58 supra, see Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408
(1955) ; Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) ; Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
For a particularly unhappy result from a failure to balance state policy against the full
faith and credit clause, see Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), where the clause was
held to require Mississippi to enforce a Missouri judgment based on a gambling debt in-
curred in Mississippi, even though such debts were considered void and unenforceable as
against public policy in Mississippi.
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Workmen's compensation cases have been most frequently the subject of
Supreme Court balancing between the demands of the full faith and credit
clause and the demands of state policy. The Court has held that the state
where the injury occurs has a sufficient interest to make an award according
to its own laws, and need not grant credit either to statutes or to compensation
awards or judgments from any other state (whose interest is based, say, on
the employee's residence or on the fact that the employment contract was
entered into there).6o The literal words of the clause are subordinated to the
interest of a state in enforcing its own policies.
More immediately relevant to the custody issue is the Court's use of balanc-
ing technique in resolving the emotionally charged issue of full faith and credit
to foreign divorce decrees. While it is admitted by all that the state of "marital
domicile" has a substantial and legitimate interest in regulating the marital
status, a majority of the Court since Williams v. North Carolina 61 has felt
that, in general, this interest is unsufficient to outweigh the policies of national
unity and certainty of status that the full faith and credit clause represents in
this area. Williams I reversed a North Carolina bigamy conviction based on a
refusal to recognize the validity of a divorce which the defendant had secured,
ex parte, in Nevada; the decision promotes geographic and social mobility by
removing uncertainty as to whether one is married or not, and to whom. 62 In
the second Williams decision,63 however, a bitterly divided Court affirmed a
second bigamy conviction, holding that North Carolina was not precluded from
inquiring into the authenticity of the complaining party's alleged Nevada
domicile-an element necessary for jurisdiction of the Nevada court which
awarded the ex parte divorce. In effect, the terms of the Williams I balance
were altered. The "need for certainty" theme was not carried to its logical
extreme, and North Carolina's interest in the Williams marriage was given
some effect. Furthermore, the Court discounted any weight to be given to the
interest of the divorce-rendering state where it was not, in the eyes of an-
other state, the genuine domicile of at least one of the parties. In Sherrer v.
Sherrer,04 involving an attack on the validity of a foreign divorce by a recant-
ing spouse who had taken part in the proceedings, the Court qualified Wil-
60. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) ; Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330
U.S. 622 (1947) ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
In the controversial Magnolia decision, however, the Court refused to make a similar
exception to the full faith and credit mandate to allow the state of the employee's residence to
disregard (actually, to supplement) an award made by a workmen's compensation com-
mission in the state where the injury occurred. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430 (1943). See Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 CoLum. L. REv. 330 (1944).
61. 317 U.S. 287 (1942) [hereinafter referred to as Williams I to distinguish it from
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) ].
62. 317 U.S. at 299-305, esp. at 303: "society ... has an interest in the avoidance of
polygamous marriages."
63. 325 U.S. 226 (1945) [hereinafter referred to as Williams II].
64. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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liams II by holding that collateral attacks on the jurisdiction of the decree-
issuing state were to be limited to cases in which the decree was issued in
ex parte proceedings. Whether this decision, which seemed to rely on doc-
trines of estoppel, would bar a Williams-type bigamy prosecution by a state
is not clear. Sherrer provoked an impassioned dissent by Justices Frankfurter
and Murphy,65 demonstrating that the basic balancing rationale of Williams I,
which had been reaffirmed by the Sherrer majority, had not yet won universal
acceptance, even on the Court. The dissent clearly accepts balancing as the
dispositive method, however; it merely argues that the Court's decisions had
subordinated legitimate state interests in the marriage field to the whimsical
divorce policies of "bargain-counter" states like Nevada.66
The Williams line of cases, standing alone, might suggest that, in general,
the interests of national unity demand that one state's regulation of the in-
cidents of the marriage status must be given credit in all other states. But this
is too broad and simplistic a reading of Williams I. A state's interest in mak-
ing divorces difficult to obtain may reflect varied policies: e.g., that the family
is important as an institution ensuring mutual support for husband and wife,
channeling each into performing certain highly valued social roles; and that
the family provides the best setting for rearing children and inculcating social
values. Under Williams I-as qualified by Williams Il-a state will not ordi-
narily be permitted to effectuate these various policies by preserving the
marriage status through a bigamy prosecution. If the state's only technique
for expressing its interest is as harsh and as remotely supportive of state in-
terests as a bigamy prosecution, the state interest will not be seen as overrid-
ing the certainty of status and mobility interests--which the full faith and
credit clause protects.
Nevertheless, where the need for certainty and finality is not so poignant,
where the prospective result is not so severe, and where state action will direct-
ly effectuate state interests, the state of marital domicile may be permitted to
assert its interest in a particular aspect of the terminated marital status in
spite of the existence of a foreign judgment, through a division of the divorce
decree. Thus the Court has held in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt 67 that an alimony
decree appurtenant to an ex parte divorce decree is not entitled to full faith
and credit, even though the divorce decree is so entitled. A state's interest in
regulating the amount of alimony paid to a resident spouse is directly related
to its interest in the economic welfare of that spouse. This assistance had been
provided for during the duration of the marriage and the state may wish to
preserve it.68 Here the state's interest outweighs the policy of national unity
and finality of litigation embodied in the full faith and credit clause.
65. Id. at 356.
66. Id. at 366-70, 377. See generally 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 289-400 (1935), for a
group of articles on the problem of "migratory divorces" in the United States.
67. 354 U.S. 416 (1957). The concept of "divisible divorce" was explicitly recognized
in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948), which involved a pre-existent New York support
award allegedly superseded by a Nevada divorce decree. See generally, Note, Divisible
Divorce, 76 HARv. L. Rxv. 1233 (1963).
68. See Estinv. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,547 (1948).
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Custody of children, as related to their moral, emotional and economic wel-
fare, also is a particular concern of the state in regulating the family as an
institution. The state interest in child custody is at least as substantial as the
interest in ensuring adequate alimony awards; the interest in custody is per-
haps more substantial because of the peculiarly vulnerable position, psycho-
logically and economically, of the child whose parents are divorced,6 9 and the
state's special responsibility as guardian of children.70 And, like the alimony
decree, a custody award is divisible from the divorce decree for full faith and
credit purposes.7 ' Thus, it appears that, for at least some states, a degree of
freedom from the effect of the full faith and credit clause is justified.
Any attempt to formulate what degree of freedom from full faith and credit
is advisable should consider the functional utility of giving res judicata effect
to custody decrees. The benefits of finality in child custody situations are a
matter of dispute, and may vary considerably with the thoroughness with
which the plan of family reorganization imposed by the decree has been con-
sidered by the court. The dominant view is that the need for finality is of slight
importance.7 2 This view is reflected in the Supreme Court's hesitation to de-
cide the full faith and credit issue, and may be based in community sympathies
for parents deprived of their children and a belief that the changing needs of
a growing child merit frequent reexamination of the custody awards. The view
is further buttressed by the change in circumstances rule, the constant pres-
sures of parents for relitigation, and judicial disapprobation of the frequently
primitive procedures by which the "best interests" of the child have been con-
sidered by another court. The opposing view, that finality is to be encouraged
in the interests of the child, draws support from psychiatric opinion that the
child who has been subjected to the trauma of a disintegrated home needs,
above all else, a stable and secure relationship to an adult family authority
figure for successful psychological development.7" If the need for stability leads
to adoption of finality as a goal, the Court must also recognize that the for-
mulation it chooses to reflect this must account for the impact on finality of a
non-regulated change-in-circumstances rule. Finality can only be meaningful
if circumvention of its effect by means of a liberally applied change of cir-
69. See generally Davis, Sociological and Statistical Analysis, 10 LAW & CONTEMPT.
PROB. 700 (1944) ; Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 807 (1944); JACOBS & GOEBEL, DOMESTIc RELATIONS 881 (1961). And
economically, of course, the child is likely to be in a helpless position.
70. "[T]he Court has an independent interest in the welfare of the children of a
marriage when the parents request a divorce." Bronson, Custody on Appeal, 10 LAW &
CONTEfP. PROB. 737, 739-40 (1944). And see Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody,
10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 721, 722-23 (1944).
71. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 531 (1953).
72. See note 52 supra.
73. See note 50 supra. But it is only where the granting court has been thorough in its
consideration of custody alternatives that later courts are likely to be willing to respect its
choice, rather than to engage in an independent investigation based upon a permissive at-
titude toward "changed circumstances!'
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cumstance test is either unlikely, because of low state interest in the child, or
readily detected and combatted.
As has been seen,74 it seems unwise for the Supreme Court to set the degree
of freedom from full faith and credit by supervision of child custody proce-
dures or by the adoption as a federal policy of any one of the competing stand-
ards and theories for custody disposition. But by employing a balancing test
approach, analogous to the approach in the alimony area, the Court may be
able to establish some impulse toward the desired results of improved proce-
dures and responsible reconsideration of custody decrees.75 Such a test should
balance the interests in the child of the first and second states, awarding full
faith and credit to the decree of the first state only if it has the superior in-
terest and denying full faith and credit to decrees from states with the inferior
interest. The obvious basis of this selection is that the state with the more
substantial interest in the child would be more likely to give the fullest con-
sideration to the child's welfare, feel the greatest right to determine the child's
future, and be the most likely to evade application of full faith and credit when
it felt this was necessary. The application of the test would render some states
free to modify custody awards, without reference to the full faith and credit
clause, while others with subordinate interests would be strictly limited in
their power to modify by the test's effect.
The state where the child permanently resides-at the time of the decree or
of the collateral challenge to it-would appear to have the most substantial in-
terest in the welfare and development of that child.76 As long as government
is given a role in educating children and regulating their behavior and environ-
ment, the state of the child's residence is in the best position to make an effec-
tive and meaningful custody award, and has the strongest claim to do so. The
judges and legislators of that state will reflect this interest in a high degree of
concern for the many aspects of his welfare. This interest should be given
recognition, not only through the protection of the full faith and credit clause,
but also by requiring that states with an inferior interest do not utilize a
"change of circumstances" test to avoid giving credit unless substantial evi-
dence of a change has been presented.
Where the original custody decree was rendered by a state which was not
the child's permanent residence, the question of what constitutes permanent
residence would appear to be of little practical importance. The question of
whether the state in which the decree is sought to be reopened is the state of
permanent residence would usually be irrelevant; in view of the lack of a sub-
74. See text at notes 29-43 supra.
75. A full faith and credit test can also require states to respect the experimental pro-
cedures of their sister states, for the same reasons that it has been urged the Court must.
See note 36 upra and accompanying text.
76. The child's residency as a basis of custody jurisdiction has become more frequently
used. See note 5 supra. Residency, of course, is not a self-defining concept and, in practice,
may be the subject of considerable confusion. The Williams litigation, discussed at notes
61-63 supra, points up this problem in the divorce area. And see Baker v. Keck, 13 F. Supp.
486 (E.D. Ill. 1936).
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stantial interest in the child on the part of the first state, inferred from the
fact that the child was not a permanent resident, it would be rare that the
second state's interest would be inferior. But where the original custody de-
cree has been rendered by a state of the child's residence (most likely, the state
of the old marital domicile), and a party seeks modification in another state,
claiming that that second state is now the child's residence, the determination
of the question becomes crucial; it would, under the suggested test, directly
govern the applicability of the full faith and credit clause. In the usual situa-
tion, where the child moves with his custodian to another state, the problem
is not so serious: any challenge asserting a change in the child's residence can
be defended by the custodian, who can try to demonstrate that he has no in-
tention of permanently remaining in the second state; the adversary system
can be relied upon here to air fully and resolve the residency issue. Where,
however, the child's residence in the second state is claimed by a party who
has himself brought the child there for purposes of challenging an original
decree issued by a state of permanent residence, real possibility for abuse of
the residency standard exists. In an effort to discourage such artificial crea-
tions of residency in another state by a "kidnapping" party who lost in a cus-
tody battle in a state of permanent residence, the Court could insist that the
claimed new residence of the child be shown to have been established bona
fides, i.e., legally with respect to the already existent custody decree. To fur-
ther discourage relitigation where a permanent residence state has already
awarded custody, the Court might, along the same lines, exclude other bases
of residency asserted to show sufficient state interest, such as summer vacation
residency, frequently present in divided custody awards. However, where each
parent is awarded custody for a substantial period of time, there may be strong
reason to consider both states of parental residence, if there be two, as the
permanent residence of the child.
Applying the proposed test to Ford, two factors suggest that the South
Carolina courts need not have given full faith and credit to the Virginia decree.
First, Virginia could not have been considered the state of the child's perma-
nent residence at the time its decree was rendered. At the commencement of
the Virginia action, the Ford children had been in the state only one day,
having been brought by their mother to the home of their grandparents. Mrs.
Ford moved to South Carolina shortly after the Virginia decree was entered,
and the Ford children apparently returned to North Carolina with their
father.77 In retrospect, Virginia's interest in the children would seem to have
been minimal; recognition of the transiency of Virginia's interest may well
have contributed to the trial judge's perfunctory treatment of the custody is-
sue. Second, even if Virginia had satisfied a permanent residence test, it could
be argued that South Carolina's interest in the children under the divided
custody award effected by the Virginia decree was sufficient to qualify it as
well as North Carolina (which was not involved in the Ford case) as a state
of permanent residence. Whether its contact with the children-during three
77. Ford v. Ford, 239 S.C. 305, 307-08, 123 S.E.2d 33,34 (1961).
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months in the summer and several weeks at Christmas-was substantial
enough to establish a claim of permanent residence, is a close question; in
any event, its interest was clearly stronger than that of Virginia, which had
no continuing contact with the children whatsoever.
The suggested "balancing of interests" test would liberate a state with a
substantial interest in the child from the literal restriction of the full faith and
credit clause, and permit it to apply its own policies to guide the development
of that child. At the same time a state with no real interest in the continuing
welfare of the child is precluded from disturbing a "resident state's" custody
decree, whether by denying full faith and credit or by a Procrustean use of
the change in circumstances rule. This use of the full faith and credit clause
protects child custody decrees from modifications based on frivolous assertions
of state interests, while permitting legitimate state interests to be asserted. The
proposed test adjusts the competing claims of states without requiring subter-
fuge and misuse of doctrine to set aside foreign custody decrees. The test,
moreover, would not cast the Court in a dubious role,78 but would permit it
to fulfill in a meaningful and constructive way its accepted function of mediat-
ing between conflicting state interests.
78. See text at notes 29-43 supra.
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